We give efficient protocols and matching accuracy lower bounds for frequency estimation in the local model for differential privacy. In this model, individual users randomize their data themselves, sending differentially private reports to an untrusted server that aggregates them.
INTRODUCTION
Consider a software producer that wishes to gather statistics on how people use its software. If the software handles sensitive information -for example, a browser for anonymous web surfing or a financial management software-users may not want to share their data with the producer. A producer may not want to collect the raw data either, lest they be subject to subpoena. How can the producer collect high-quality aggregate information about users while ⇤ Work done while A.S. was on sabbatical at Boston University and Harvard University.
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In the local model for private data analysis (also called the randomized response model 1 ), each individual user randomizes her data herself using a randomizer Qi to obtain a report (or "signal") zi which she sends to an untrusted server to be aggregated in to a summary s that can be used to answer queries about the data (Figure 1) . The server may provide public coins visible to all parties, but privacy guarantees depend only on the randomness of the user's local coins. The local model has been studied extensively because control of private data remains in users' hands. We focus on protocols that provide differential privacy [6] (or, equivalently in the local model, -amplification [10] or FRAPP [1] ). DEFINITION 1.1. We say that an algorithm Q : V ! Z is We describe new protocols and lower bounds for frequency estimation and finding heavy hitters in the local privacy model. Local differentially private protocols for frequency estimation are used in the Chrome web browser (Erlingsson et al. [9] , Fanti et al. [11] ), and can be used as the basis of other estimation tasks (see Mishra and Sandler [21] , Dwork and Nissim [5] ).
We also show a generic result for LDP protocols: in the publiccoin setting, each user only needs to send 1 bit to the server.
Suppose that there are n users, and each user i holds a value vi in a universe of size d (labeled by integers in [d] = {1, ..., d}). We wish to enable an analyst to estimate frequencies: f (v) = 1 n #{i : vi = v} . Following Hsu et al. [14] , we look at summaries that provide two types of functionality:
• A frequency oracle, denoted FO, is a data structure together with an algorithm A that, for any v 2 V, allows computing an estimatef (v) = A(FO, v) of the frequency f (v).
The error of the oracle FO is the maximum over items v of |f (v) f (v)|. That is, we measure the`1 error of the histogram estimate implicitly defined byf . A protocol for generating frequency oracles has error (⌘, ) if for all data sets, it produces an oracle with error ⌘ with probability at least 1 .
• A succinct histogram, denoted S-Hist, is a data structure that provides a (short) list of itemsv1, ...,v k , called the heavy hitters, together with estimated frequencies (f (vj) : j 2
[k]). The frequencies of the items not in the list are implicitly estimated asf (v) = 0. As with the frequency oracle, we measure the error of S-Hist by the`1 distance between the estimated and true frequencies,
If a data structure aims to provide error ⌘, the list need never contain more than O(1/⌘) items (since items with estimated frequencies below ⌘ may be omitted from the list, at the price of at most doubling the error).
If we ignore computation, these two functionalities are equivalent since a succinct histogram defines a frequency oracle directly and an analyst with a frequency oracle FO can query the oracle on all possible items and retain only those with estimated frequencies above a threshold ⌘ (increasing the error by at most ⌘). However, when the universe size d is large (for example, if a user's input is their browser's home page or a financial summary), succinct histograms are much more useful.
We say a protocol is efficient if it has computation time, communication and storage polynomial in n and log(d) (the users' input length). Prior to this work, efficient protocols for both tasks satisfied only (✏, )-LDP for > 0. Efficient protocols for frequency oracles [21, 14] were known with worst-case expected er-
), while the only protocols for succinct histograms [14] had much worse error -about
. Very recently, Fanti et al. [11] proposed a heuristic construction for which worst-case bounds are not known. None of these protocols matched the best lower bound on accuracy, ⌦(1/ p n) [14] .
Our Results
Efficient Local Protocols for Succinct Histograms with Optimal Error. We provide the first polynomial time local (✏, 0)-differentially private protocol for succinct histograms that has worst-case error
As we show, this error is optimal for local protocols (regardless of computation time). Furthermore, in the public coin model, each participant sends only 1 bit to the server.
Previous constructions were either inefficient [21, 14] (taking time polynomial in d rather than log d), or had much worse error guarantees 2 -at least ⌦ log(d)
. Furthermore, constructions with communication sublinear in d satisfied only (✏, ) privacy for > 0. Our construction consists of two main pieces. Our first protocol efficiently recovers a heavy hitter from the input, given a promise 2 Mishra and Sandler [21] state error bounds for a single query to the frequency oracle, assuming the query is determined before the protocol is executed. Known frequency oracle constructions (both previous work and ours) achieve error O( p log(1/ )/n) in that error model. that the heavy hitter is unique: that is, all players either have a particular value v (initially unknown to the server) or a default value ?. The idea is to have each player send a highly noisy version of an error-correcting encoding of their input; the server can then recover (the codeword for) v by averaging all the received reports and decoding the resulting vector.
Our full protocol, which works for all inputs, uses ideas from the literature on low-space algorithms and compressive sensing, e.g., [12] . Specifically, using random hashing, we can partition the universe of possible items into bins in which there is likely to be only a single heavy hitter. Running many copies of the protocol for unique heavy hitters in parallel, we can recover the list of heavy hitters. A careful analysis shows that the cost to privacy is essentially the same as running only a single copy of the underlying protocol.
Along the way, we provide simpler and more private frequencyoracle protocols. Specifically, we show that the "JL" protocol of Hsu et al. [14] can be made (✏, 0)-differentially private, and can be simplified to use computations in much smaller dimension (roughly, O(n) instead of ⌦(n 4 log d)). Lower Bounds on Error. We show that, regardless of computation time and communication, every local (✏, )-DP protocol for frequency estimation has worst-case error ⌦(
n )) as long as ⌧ 1/n. This shows that our efficient protocols have optimal error.
The instances that give rise to this lower bound are simple: one particular item v (unknown to the algorithm) appears with frequency ⌘, while the remaining inputs are chosen uniformly at random from
The structure of these instances has several implications. First, our lower bounds apply equally well to worst-case error (over data sets), and "minimax error" (worst-case error over distributions in estimating the underlying distribution on data).
Second, the accuracy of frequency estimation protocols must depend on the universe size d in the local model, even if one item appears much more frequently than all others. In contrast, in a centralized model, there are (✏, )-differentially private protocols that achieve error independent of the universe size, assuming only that there is a small gap (about log(1/ ) ✏n ) between the frequencies of the heaviest and second-heaviest hitters.
The proof of our lower bounds adapts (and simplifies) a framework developed by Duchi et al. [4] for translating lower bounds on statistical estimation to the local privacy model. We make their framework more modular, and show that it can be used to prove lower bounds for (✏, )-differentially private protocols for 0 < < 1/n (in its original instantiation, it applied only for = 0). One lemma, possibly of independent interest, states that the mutual information between the input and output of a local protocol is at most O(✏ 2 + ✏ log(d✏/ )). In particular, the relaxation with > 0 does not allow one to circumvent information-theoretic lower bounds unless is very large. 1-bit Protocols Suffice for Local Privacy. We show that a slight modification to the compression technique of McGregor et al. [20, Theorem 14] yields the following: in a public coin model (where the server and players have access to a common random string), every (✏, 0)-DP local protocol can be transformed so that each user sends only a single bit to the server. Moreover, the transformation is efficient under the assumption that one can efficiently compute conditional probabilities Q(y|x) for the randomizers in the protocol. To our knowledge, all the local protocols in the literature (in particular, our efficient protocol for heavy hitters) satisfy this extra computability condition.
The randomness of the public coins affects utility but not privacy in the transformed protocol; in particular, the coins may be gener-ated by the untrusted server, by applying a pseudorandom function to the user's ID (if it is available), or by expanding a short seed sent by the user using a pseudorandom generator.
The transformation, following [20] , is based on rejection sampling: the public coins are used to select a random sample from a fixed distribution, and a player uses his input to decide whether or not the sample should be kept (and used by the server) or ignored. This decision is transmitted as 1 bit to the server. Local privacy ensures that the rejection sampling procedure accepts with sufficiently large probability (and leaks little information about the input).
Other Related Work
In addition to the works mentioned so far on frequency estimation [21, 14, 9, 11] , many papers have studied the complexity of local private protocols for specific tasks.
Most relevant here are the results of [15, 4] on learning and statistical estimation in the local model. Kasiviswanathan et al. [15] showed that when data are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution, then every LDP learning algorithm can be simulated in the statistical queries model [16] . In particular, they showed that learning parity and related functions requires an exponential amount of data. Their simulation technique is the inspiration for our communication reduction result.
Recently, Duchi et al. [4] studied a class of convex statistical estimation problems, giving tight (minimax-optimal) error guarantees. One of the local randomizers developed in [4] was the basis for the "basic randomizer" which is a building block for our protocols. Moreover, our lower bounds are based on the information-theoretic framework they establish.
Finally, our efficient protocols are based on ideas from the large literature on streaming algorithms and compressive sensing (as were the efficient protocols of Hsu et al. [14] ). For example, the use of hashing to isolate unique "heavy" items appears in the context of sparse approximations to a vector's Fourier representation [12] (and arguably that idea has roots in learning algorithms for Fourier coefficients such as [18] ). This provides further evidence of the close relationship between low-space algorithms and differential privacy (see, e.g., [8, 7, 3, 17, 22] ).
BUILDING BLOCKS

The Basic Randomizer
We describe a basic randomizer (Algorithm 1) that will be used in our constructions as a tool to ensure that each user generates an ✏-differentially private report. This randomizer is a more concise version of one of the randomizers in Duchi et al. [4] .
Our basic randomizer R takes as input either an m-bit string represented by one of the vertices of the hypercube
or a special symbol represented by the all-zero m-length vector 0. The randomizer R picks a bit xj at random from the input string x (where j is the index of the chosen bit), then it randomizes and scales xj to generate a bit zj 2 { c✏ p m, c✏ p m} (for some fixed
Finally, R outputs the pair (j, zj). As will become clear later in our constructions, the m-bit input of R will be a unique encoding of one of the items in V whereas the special symbol 0 will serve notational purposes to describe a special situation in our constructions when a user sends no information about its item. where c✏ = e
Generate a uniform bit: zj { c✏ p m, c✏ p m}.
where zj is in the j-th position of z. (This output can be represented concisely by the pair (j, zj) using dlog me + 1 bits).
THEOREM 2.1. R has the following properties:
1. R is ✏-LDP, for every choice of the index j (that is, privacy depends only on the randomness in Step 3).
For every
x 2 { 1 p m , 1 p m } m [ {0}, R(x) is an unbiased estimator of x. That is, E [R(x)] = x.
R is computationally efficient (i.e., R runs in O (m) time).
As noted in Step 6 of the algorithm, we view the output of R as a vector z 2 R m of the same length as the input vector x. However, the output can be represented concisely by only dlog me + 1 bits (required to describe the index j and zj).
In some settings, we may compress this output to just 1 bit. This comes from the fact that the privacy of R holds no matter how the index j is chosen in Step 1, so long as it is independent of the input. (The randomness of j is important for utility since it helps ensure that E [R(x)] = x.) In particular, the randomness in the choice of j may come from outside the randomizer: it could be sent by the server, available as public coins, or generated pseudorandomly from other information. In such situations, the server receives j through other channels and we may represent the output using the single bit describing zj.
A Private Frequency Oracle
We give an efficient private frequency oracle that follows almost the same lines of the construction of [14] . Our protocol differs from [14] in three respects. First, we use the construction only to provide a frequency oracle as opposed to identifying and estimating the frequency of heavy hitters. For that purpose, the construction is computationally efficient. The second difference is in the local randomization step at each user. Here, each user i 2 [n] uses an independent copy of the basic randomizer Ri given by Algorithm 1 (as opposed to adding noise as in [14] ). This gives us pure ✏-differential privacy guarantee (as opposed to (✏, ) in [14] ). The third difference is that computations are carried out in much smaller dimension, namely O(n) as opposed to ⌦(n 4 log(d)) in [14] . The description of our frequency oracle construction protocol is given in the full version [2] . We refer to such protocol as PROT-FO. This protocol outputs a frequency oracle FO which is composed of two objects; a succinct description of a binary matrix whose columns represent encodings of each item in V, and, an aggregate measurement of users reportsz. Given our private frequency oracle, there is a simple efficient algorithm A FO (see the full version [2] for a complete description) that, for any given input v 2 V, uses the frequency oracle to obtain a private estimatê f (v) of the frequency f (v) of the item v by simply computing the inner product between the encoding of v under and an aggregate measurementz, which is the average of users' reports.
In protocol PROT-FO, the length of encoding of an item under is O(n), the report length of each user is O(log(n)), and the total amount of randomness required to generate is O(n 2 ) random bits. Also, each basic randomizer is efficient, i.e., runs in O(n) steps (Part 3 of Theorem 2.1). Hence, the construction is computationally efficient. Also, generating an estimatef (v) for a given item v using A FO takes only O(n) time.
The privacy and utility guarantees of the frequency oracle constructed by PROT-FO are given in the following theorems. THEOREM 2.2. The construction of the frequency oracle FO given by Protocol PROT-FO is ✏-differentially private. THEOREM 2.3. Let ✏ > 0. For any set of users items {v1, ..., vn} and any > 0, the error due to FO constructed by Protocol PROT-FO is bounded as
! with probability at least 1 over the randomness of the projection and the basic randomizers Ri, i 2 [n], wheref (v) denote the output of Procedure A FO on an input v.
The above upper bound is asymptotically tight (Section 5). The theorem's proof relies on the concentration of the inner product between the aggregatez and the encoding of any given item under the encoding matrix . See the full version [2] for details.
EFFICIENT CONSTRUCTION WITH OPTIMAL ERROR
In this section, our goal is to construct an efficient private succinct histogram using the private frequency oracle given in the previous subsection together with other tools. In Section 3.1, we first give a construction for a simpler problem that we call the unique heavy hitter problem. Then, in Section 3.2, we give a reduction from this problem to the general problem.
The Unique Heavy Hitter Problem
In the unique heavy hitter problem, we are given the promise that at least an ⌘ fraction of the n users hold the same item v ⇤ for some v ⇤ 2 V unknown to the server (here ⌘ is a parameter of the promise), and that all other users hold a special symbol ?, representing "no item".
Our goal is to obtain an efficient construction of a private succinct histogram under this promise, for as small a value ⌘ as possible. We will take ⌘ to be at least C ✏ q log(d) n for a universal constant C > 0. Our protocol is differentially private on all inputs. Under the promise, with high probability, it outputs the correct v ⇤ together with an estimatef (v
The main idea of the protocol is to first encode user's items with an error-correcting code and randomize the resulting codeword before sending it to the server. The redundancy in the code allows the server learn the unknown item v ⇤ from the noisy reports. We require an efficiently encodable and decodable binary (d, m,⇣ )-code (of d codewords, block length m, and relative distance ⇣) where m = O(log(d)) with constant rate (so that m = O(log(d))) and constant relative minimum distance ⇣ 2 (0, 1/2), say ⇣ = 1/4.
(We do not require the rate log d m or relative distance ⇣ to be optimal; these quantities will affect the constants in the error of our construction but not the asymptotic behavior.) There are several known constructions of such codes in the literature (see [13] for examples). Fix one such code, denoted code(d, m,⇣ ), with associated encoder c and decoder Dec. The code is part of the protocol and so is known to all parties. For convenience, we represent codewords as points in the unit-radius hypercube { 1
Instead, the server first rounds the aggregated signalz to the nearest point y in the hypercube before running Dec. We argue that the combination of noise from randomization and the rounding step produces a vector y that is sufficiently close to x with high probability.
Algorithm 2 precisely describes our construction for the promise problem. The protocol is computationally efficient, i.e., the total computational cost is poly(log(d), n) since code(d, m,⇣ ) = (c, Dec) runs in time poly(log(d)) and each basic randomizer Ri runs in time O(log(d)). In fact, the computational cost at each user does not depend on n. Also, we note that the users' reports are succinct, namely, the report length is O (log (log(d))) bits. If vi 6 = ?, then user i encodes its item: xi = c(vi). Else, user i sets xi = 0.
3:
User i computes its private report: zi = Ri (xi, ✏).
4:
User i sends zi to the server. To analyze utility, we first isolate the guarantee provided by the rounding step. Let Sm = {w 2 R m : kwk2 = 1} denote the m-dimensional unit sphere. 
x is less than m⇣/2, i.e., P m j=1 1(yj 6 = xj) < m⇣ /2. PROOF. Since z and x are unit vectors, the distance kz xk2 satisfies
promise such that, with probability at least 1 , Protocol PROT PP -S-Hist PP publishes the right item v ⇤ and the frequency estimation error is bounded by
PROOF. Consider the conditions of the promise. Let v ⇤ 2 V be the unique heavy hitter (occurring with frequency at least ⌘). Let > 0. Given Lemma 3.2, to show that the protocol above recovers the correct item v ⇤ with probability at least 1 /2, it suffices to show that, with probability at least 1 /2, we have
Note that the rounding step (Step 6 in Algorithm 2) would produce the same output whether it was run withz or its normalized counterpartz/kzk2. By the promise, we havē
where T denotes the set of users having the item v ⇤ . (Note that ⌘ with probability 1. Applying McDiarmid's inequality [19] , with proba-
Thus, with probability at least 1 /4, kzk2 is bounded by
Next, we consider hc(v
By the tail properties of the distribution of the second and third terms above 3 , we can show that with probability at least 1 /4, we have
Putting (1) and (2) together, then, with probability at least 1 /2, we have
where we use the fact that ⌘  f (v ⇤ ) and assume that the numerator in the right-hand side is positive.
Since m = O(log(d)), then there is a constant ↵ ⇣ that depends on ⇣ such that if we set ⌘ = ↵
, then the above ratio is greater than 1 ⇣/4. This proves that there is a setting
S-Hist PP outputsv = v with probability at least 1 /2. Now, conditioned on correct decoding, for all v 6 = v ⇤ , the estimatef (v) is implicitly assumed to be zero (which is perfectly accurate in this case). Thus, it remains to inspectf (v ⇤ ). Observe that
Again, by the tail properties of the sums above, with probability at
Therefore, with probability at least 1 , protocol PROT PP -S-Hist PP recovers the correct common item v ⇤ and the estimation error that is bounded by O
Efficient Construction for the General Problem
In this section, we provide an efficient construction of private succinct histograms with optimal error for the general setting of the problem using the two protocols discussed in the previous sections as sub-protocols.
In the promise (unique heavy hitter) problem, the main advantage was the lack of interference from the users who do not hold the heavy hitter v ⇤ in question. The main idea here is to obtain a reduction in which we create the conditions of the promise problem separately for each heavy hitter v ⇤ 2 V such that the extra computational cost is at most a small poly(n) factor. To do this, we hash each item v 2 V into one of K separate parallel channels such that users holding the same item will transmit their reports in the same channel. Each user, in the remaining K 1 channels, will simulate an "idle" user with item ? as in the promise problem. By choosing K sufficiently large, and repeating the protocol in parallel for T times 4 , we can guarantee that, with high probability, every heavy hitter v ⇤ 2 V gets assigned to an interference-free channel. Hence, by using an error-optimal construction for the promise problem like S-Hist PP in each one of these channels, we eventually obtain a list of at most KT items such that, with high probability, all the heavy hitters will be on that list. However, this list may also contain other erroneously decoded items due to hash collisions and we do not know which items on the list are the heavy hitters. To overcome this, in a separate parallel channel of the protocol, we run a frequency oracle protocol (like PROT-FO) and use the resulting frequency oracle to estimate the frequencies of all the items on that list, then output all the items whose estimated frequencies are above ⌘ together with their estimated frequencies.
For the purpose of this construction, it suffices to use a pairwise independent hash function Hash : {0, 1}`⇥ V ! [K] whose first input is a random seed s 2 {0, 1}`. Choices of`and K are given in the protocol description (Algorithm 3). All users and the server are assumed to have access to Hash. We use a source of public randomness RndGen that, on an input integer`> 0, generates a seed for Hash, which is a random uniform string from {0, 1}`that is seen by everyone 5 .
Algorithm 3 PROT-S-Hist: ✏-LDP Efficient Protocol for Succinct Histograms
Input: Users' inputs {vi 2 V [ {? }: i 2 [n]}, the privacy parameter ✏, and the confidence parameter > 0.
1: LIST
; (initialize list of heavy hitters to the empty set.) 2:` 2 max (log(d), log(n)) ; K n 3/2 . 3: T dlog(3/ )e 4: for t = 1 to T do 5:
st RndGen(`).
6:
for Channels k = 1 to K do 7:
for Users i = 1 to n do Iff
It is not hard to see that the total computational cost of this construction is
where cost PP , cost FO , and costA FO are the computational costs of the promise problem sub-protocol, the frequency oracle subprotocol, and the algorithm that computes a given frequency estimate, respectively. Hence, for our choice of the sub-protocols above, one can easily verify the overall worst case cost of our construction O(n 5/2 poly(log(d)) log(1/ )). 5 We may also think of RndGen as being run at the server which then announces the resulting random string to all the users.
The report length of each user is now scaled by KT compared to that of the promise problem, that is, O ⇣ n 3/2 log(1/ ) log (log(d))
⌘ . In the next section, we will discuss an approach that gets it down to 1 bit at the expense of increasing the public coins. THEOREM 3.4. Protocol PROT-S-Hist given by Algorithm 3 is ✏-differentially private.
PROOF. First, observe that Protocol PROT-S-Hist runs Protocol PROT PP -S-Hist PP over KT channels and runs Protocol PROT-FO once over a separate channel. In the first KT channels, for any fixed sequence of the values of the seed of the hash function, the reports of each user over these channels are independent. Moreover, each user gets assigned to exactly T channels. Fix any user i and any two items vi, v 0 i 2 V. Using these observations, one can see that, for any fixed sequence of values of the seed of the hash over these KT channels, the distribution of the report of user i when its item is vi differs from the distribution when the user's item is v 0 i in at most 2T channels, and in each of these channels, the ratio between the two distributions is at most e ✏ 2T +1 by the differential privacy of PROT PP -S-Hist PP (note that the input privacy parameter to in Step 9 is e ✏ 2T +1 ). Hence, by independence of the user's reports over separate channels, the corresponding ratio over all the KT channels is at most e 2T ✏ 2T +1 . In the separate channel for the frequency oracle protocol, again by the differential privacy of PROT-FO, this ratio is bounded by e ✏ 2T +1 . Putting this together with the argument in the previous paragraph completes the proof. THEOREM 3.5. For any set of users' items {v1, ..., vn} and any
, a list of all items whose frequencies are greater than ⌘), and the error in the frequency estimates satisfies
(As mentioned before, the frequency estimates of items v / 2 LIST are implicitly zero.) PROOF. Let U denote the set of the users' items {v1, ..., vn}. We first show that for the setting of K and T in Algorithm 3, running PROT PP -S-Hist PP over KT channels will isolate every heavy hitter (i.e., every item occurring with frequency at least ⌘) in at least one channel without interference from other items. Let
⌘} denote the set of the heavy hitters. Note that |Heavhit|  1
, then with probability at least 1 /3 (over the sequence of the seed values s1, ..., sT of Hash), for every heavy hitter v ⇤ 2 Heavhit there is
First, we prove this claim. Fix
⇤ }| denote the number of collisions between v ⇤ and users' items that are different from v ⇤ when the hash seed is st. First, we bound the expected number of such collisions:
Hence, by Markov's inequality, with probability at least 1
Hence, with probability at least 1 1
, which proves the claim. This implies that with probability at least 1 /3, there is a set W ⇢ [KT ] of "good" channels whose size is the same as the number of heavy hitters such that each heavy hitter v ⇤ 2 Heavhit is hashed into one of these channels without collisions. Conditioned on this event, let w 2 W and let v ⇤ w denote the heavy hitter in channel w. By Theorem 3.3, running Protocol PROT PP -S-Hist PP over channel w yields the correct estimate of v ⇤ w with probability at least 1 3d (Step 9 of Algorithm 3). Hence, with probability at least 1 /3, all estimates of PROT PP -S-Hist PP in all channels in W are correct. Hence, at this point, with probability at least 1 2 3 , LIST contains all the heavy hitters in Heavhit among other possibly unreliable estimates of PROT PP -S-Hist PP for the channels in
[KT ] \ W. Now, conditioned on the event above, by the error guarantee of FO given by Theorem 2.3, with probability at least 1 /3, the maximum error in the frequency estimates of all the items in LIST (Step 13 of Algorithm 3), denoted by ERR (LIST), is
Hence, all those items in LIST with actual frequencies greater than
will be kept in LIST whereas all those items with frequency less than ⌘ will be removed. Note that the frequency estimates that are implicitly assumed to be zero of those items that are not on the list cannot have error greater than ⌘ since their actual frequencies are less than ⌘. This completes the proof.
THE FULL PROTOCOL
Generic Protocol with 1-Bit Reports
In this section, we give a generic approach that transforms any private protocol in the distributed setting (not necessarily for frequency estimation or succinct histograms) to a private distributed protocol where the report of each user is a single bit at the expense of adding to the overall original public randomness a number of bits that is O(n⌧ ) where ⌧ is the length of each user's report in the original protocol. As mentioned in the introduction, the transformation is a modification of the general compression technique of McGregor et al. [20] .
Let GenPROT be any private distributed protocol in which n users are communicating with an untrusted server. GenPROT follows the following general steps. Each user i 2 [v] has a data point
. We assume, w.l.o.g., that Qi may also take a special symbol ? as an input. Each user runs its ✏-local randomizer Qi on its data vi (and any public randomness in the protocol, if any) and outputs a report zi. For simplicity, each report zi is assumed to be a binary string of length ⌧ . Let stat : V n ! C be some statistic about the data that the server wishes to estimate where C is some bounded subset of R k for some integer k > 0. The server collects the reports {zi : i 2 [n]} and runs some algorithm Astat on the reports (and the public randomness) and outputs an estimate
vn).
We now give a generic construction 1-Bit-GenPROT (Algorithm 4) for GenPROT where each user's report is one bit.
Algorithm 4 1-Bit-PROT: ✏-LDP Generic 1-Bit Protocol Input: Users' inputs {vi 2 V : i 2 [n]} and a privacy parameter ✏  ln(2). 1: Generate n independent public strings y1 Q1(?), ..., yn Qn(?). 2: for Users i = 1 to n do 3:
.
4:
Sample a bit bi from Bernoulli(pi) and sends it to the server.
5: Reports
;. {Server initialize the set of collected reports.} 6: for i = 1 to n do 7:
Server checks if bi = 1, add yi to Reports. 8: d stat Astat (Reports) . {Run algorithm Astat on the collected reports to obtain an estimate of the desired statistic as described in the original protocol GenPROT.} 9: return d stat.
Note that the only additional computational cost in this generic transformation is in Step 3. If computing these probabilities can be done efficiently, then this transformation preserves the computational efficiency of the original protocol. by ✏-differential privacy of Qi, and since ✏  ln(2), pi  1. For any v 2 V and any public string yi, let pi(v, yi) denote the conditional probability that bi = 1 given that Qi(?) = yi when the item of user i is v. Let v, v 0 2 V be any two items. It is easy to see that p i (v,y i )
which lies in [e ✏ , e ✏ ] by ✏-differential privacy of Qi. One can also verify that 1 p i (v,y i )
. One important feature in the construction above is that the conditional distribution of the public string yi given that bi = 1 is exactly the same as the distribution of Qi(vi), and hence, upon receiving a bit bi = 1 from user i, the server's view of yi is the same as its view of an actual report zi Qi(vi). Note also that the probability that a user i 2 [n] accepts (sets bi = 1) taken over the randomness of yi is
Key statement: The two facts above show that our protocol is functionally equivalent to: first, sampling a subset of the users where each user is sampled independently with probability 1/2, then, running the original protocol GenPROT on the sample. Thus, if the original protocol is resilient to sampling, i.e., its error performance (with respect to some notion of error) is not essentially affected by this sampling step, then the generic transformation given by Algorithm 4 will have essentially the same error performance.
Efficient Construction with 1-Bit Reports
We now apply the generic transformation discussed above to our efficient protocol PROT-S-Hist (Algorithm 3) to obtain an efficient private protocol for succinct histograms with 1-bit reports and optimal error. The fact that such protocol has the same error as PROT-S-Hist follows from the key statement above and the fact that PROT-S-Hist is resilient to sampling. Computational efficiency: To show that the protocol remains efficient after this transformation, we argue that the probabilities in
Step 3 of Algorithm 4 can be computed efficiently in our case. The overall ✏-local randomizer Q Full i at each user i over all the KT + 1 parallel channels in PROT-S-Hist is described in Algorithm 5. Note that given the user's item vi and the seed of the hash, the KT + 1 components of Q Full i (vi) are independent. Moreover, note that (K 1)T of these components have the same (uniform) distribution since each user gets assigned by the hash function to only T + 1 channels and in the remainder channels the user's report is uniformly random. Hence, to execute Step 3 of Algorithm 4, each user in our case only needs to compute T + 1 probabilities out of the total KT +1 components. This is easy because of the way the basic randomizer R works. To see this, first note that each yi (referring to the public string yi in Algorithm 4) is now a sequence of (index, bit) pairs: (j1, bj 1 ) , . . . , jKT +1, bj KT +1 . To compute the probability corresponding to one of the T + 1 item-dependent components of Q 1: for t = 1 to T do 2:
denotes the report of user i in the k-th channel in the t-th group.} 4: Set z (fo)
is the vi-th column of the encoding matrix in the construction of the frequency oracle FO.} 5:
TIGHT LOWER BOUND ON ERROR
We derive a matching lower bound on the error of (✏, )-LDP frequency oracles and succinct histograms for all = o ⇣ 1 n log(n) ⌘ .
Our lower bound implies that there is no advantage of (✏, ) algorithms over pure ✏ algorithms in terms of asymptotic error for all the meaningful settings of . Our approach is inspired by some of the techniques in [4] used for lower bounds on multinomial estimation error in the pure ✏ local model. We make their framework more modular, and show that it can be used to prove lower bounds for (✏, )-local differentially private protocols. Our lower bound is formally stated in the following theorem. We discuss the main steps of our technique next. For more details on the proof, we refer the reader to the full version [2] .
Our Technique
In a scenario where the item of each user is drawn independently from an unknown distribution on V, we first derive a lower bound on the expected worst-case error (the minimax rate) in estimating the right distribution. We then show using standard concentration bounds that this implies a lower bound on the maximum error in estimating the actual frequencies of all the items in V.
To obtain a lower bound on the minimax error, we first define the notion of an ⌘-degrading channel which is a noise operator that, given a user's item as input, outputs the same item with probability ⌘, and outputs a uniform random item from V otherwise. Formally, for any ⌘ 2 [0, 1], an ⌘-degrading channel W (⌘) : V ! V is a randomized mapping that is defined as follows: for every v 2 V, W (⌘) (v) = ⇢ v with probability ⌘ U, with probability 1 ⌘
where U is a uniform random variable over V. We compare two scenarios: in the first scenario, each user feeds its item first to an ⌘-degrading channel, then feeds its output into its (✏, ) local randomizer to generate a report, whereas the second scenario is the normal scenario where the user feeds its item directly into its local randomizer. We then show that a lower bound of ⌦(1) on the minimax error in the first scenario implies a lower bound of ⌦(⌘) in the second scenario.
Thus, to reach our result, it would suffice to show that a lower bound of ⌦ (1) ◆ .
Then, we prove that the application of an ⌘-degrading channel on a user's item amplifies privacy, namely, scales down both ✏ and by ⌘. 
⌘
, our mutual information bound above together with Fano's inequality implies that the error in the first scenario is ⌦(1). This concludes the proof of our lower bound.
